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PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES ON READING*
Nathan Kroman
WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Candor requires that I disclaim any real expertise in the educational
speciality of reading instruction. This probably accounts for my writing
about it with such sublime confidence. I do, however, believe that I know
how to read. Moreover I have related to large numbers of people who are
representative of many and diverse occupational and regional sub-cultures
across the United States and Canada all of whom believe that they know
how to read. These people typically exhibit a rather particular pattern of
thinking styles. Since thinking is related tolanguage andlanguage is related
to reading and since they all learned to read through processes and
procedures that seem quite similar, it seems reasonable towonder whether
the way in which we learnto readpartially influences the way in which we
think.
Because part of this paper is a polemic against certain uses of
definitions, I feel obligated to try to avoid them myself. I believe that
through a series of true stories and anecdotes I can identify fallacies in
thought which are supported by the way our language is culturally pat
terned and taught. Although I am personally convinced that the
educational system generally serves these maladaptive latent functions, I
encourage the reader to decide whether reading instruction per se plays a
role in these processes.
Phenomena and Meaning
Before we get to the anecdotes, I shall attempt to make a distinction
between phenomena and meaning. That thing, which in our language is
commonly called the sun, is whatever it is regardless of the language or
symbol by which we refer to it. It iswhatever it isand has certain effects on
people regardless of the meanings they attach to it. On the other hand,
there are other effects that it has as a function of the many and widely
varied meanings which are assigned to it by the various cultures of
mankind. People create these meanings out of, or, if you prefer, in their
experience and the meanings they assign to those experiences. The word
mean or meaning can, in a real sense, be related to "understanding of or
"make sense of." Making sense of phenomena does not necessarily require
language but communicatingunderstanding does require language asdoes
the achievement of higher and deeper meanings. There is, I believe, a
tendency to confusephenomena with the meaningsweattach to it.
The word mean as in the question, often asked in school, "What does it
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mean?" is hard to define. I can, however, illustrate some of the senses in
which the word is used. First, we say "X means Y." In this usage we are
saying that X and Y are the same. We can, and often do, simplysay that X
means Y without assigning any value or meaning to Y. Second, we can say
that X means a collection of words which forms a phenomenal description
of X if we are sure that the wordswe use have a common meaning. Thirdly,
we can point to something which X represents. I tend to group these
together because in spite of their variation they are all the same in that the
word mean is used as an equal sign in mathematics. On the other hand we
can answer the question, "What does it mean?" by interpreting mean in its
implicative sense. That is, X means Y translates to X implies Y. "It is
raining and that means that I will not take that long walk." Lastly, mean
can be taken in its consequential sense. "It is raining and that means that
the grass will get wet." Failure to distinguish between these three meanings
assigned to mean is an example of the maladaptive function of our
language style.
Some Stories From Life
On the first day of one of my courses I tell my students that I would like
a male and a female to volunteer for a demonstration. Without warning I
strike a firm but not severe blowon the upper arm or the male. I then put
my arm gently but firmly around the shoulders of the female and hug her.
When the volunteers are seated, I turn to the class and say, "Please tell me
what you just saw." Generally, only about five percent of the class will do
what I asked them to do. In one particular class of over thirty students none
told me what they saw. Typically the replies consistedof such statements as
"You don't like him," "Hostility," "Dirty Old Man" and on and on with a
rather amazing variety of languaging all of which reflected the meanings
which they ascribed to the actions. We often confuse events with the
meanings we attach to them.
This distinction is further highlighted by the fact that many of us are
emotionally affected by film sexuality or film violence. When this happens
it is the faked and simulated behavior that affects us and certainlynot the
genuine feelings of the twodimensional patterns of light, shadow, and color
that we see as people.
We also tend to confuse language and words with understanding or
meanings. Much of education is concerned with the application and
recognition of wordswhose assignedmeaningsare equated with other words
in the sense of the equal sign discussed earlier. One fine summer day in
Canada I was on a picnicwitha friend, hiswife, and hisyoung son. The boy
asked his father to tell him why the apples fell from the tree. My friend
replied in a way that most of us would. "They fall because of gravity" or
"gravity is what makes them fall." The young fellow's eyes lit up with the
look of real insight and with a nod of sagacity responded with"Oh!! !"The
boy accepted a word which he confused with understanding. We
promulgate the use of words as a substitute for understanding. Often we
feel that only our words can express not only our own understandings but
common understandings.
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Consider, for example, the following: I once caught three philosopher
friends in conversation. I asked them for a definition of philosophy that I
could pass on to my students. When I came back about an hour and ahalf
later they were still arguing about what philosophy really was! They hadno
previous difficulty in agreeing about which human activities they would call
philosophy and which they would not call philosophy. The argument arose
only in relation to a definition. In spite of their common philosophical
background, they couldn't shake loose of the culturally patterned and
deeply embedded notion that therewas a set ofwords which had a necessary
connection to the thing which they understood to be philosophy and,
further, each was sure that his words were the words. The predictable
argument was not about philosophy at all butrather about thewords which
should refer to it.
The same assumption about a necessary relationship between a thing
and the word for it was humorously pointed out on a Canadian television
talk show. The guest said"You know, I really don't understand these people
at all. The French call itargent, the Spanish call itdinero, the Germans call
itgelt. Whythe blazes don't theycall itmoney for that iswhatit trulyis!"
Another illustration of how the rigidity about words confuses thought is
provided by another exercise I use in my classes. I ask students if, in their
opinion, unicorns are real. Typically the reply is a resounding "no."The
question as to the reality of love produces anequally resounding "yes." The
students are then asked to write their own conception or definition of
unicorns and of love. When confronted with the hard fact that they are
completely agreedon the conception or definition of that which they affirm
to be unreal and have almost total disagreement about that which they
affirm to be real, they react with confusion, consternation, and, most
interestingly, with the feeling that they havebeen tricked or duped. Their
frustration increases when I point out that it was their answers, their
meanings, their definitions and their failure to question my question that
created the problem.
Our patterned language style also promotes polarized thinking. In
school we are almost always asking either-or questions. My class is asked
whether human faces are alike or different. Only a very, very small
minority of the students either question the legitimacy of the question or
answer with the single word "both." Typically they will all either em
phatically assert that human faces are alike or that human faces are dif
ferent. Their education and the way words have been used have blinded
them to the obvious fact that, in some respects, human faces are alike and
that in other equally significant respects, no twoare alike.
Discussion
These anecdotes, although somewhat different, seem to illustrate an
underlying tendency in our thinking which I believe is related to the waywe
typically use language in our culture and, more importantly, the way in
which we unintentionally teach people to use language and to read. Critical
thinking is defined differently by different people. I will not offer a
definition for obvious reasons. However, whatever it is that people mean by
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the concept, it is part of the processes of both the creation of knowledge as
well as its application. It probably also is not merely the substitution of one
set of words for another. For me it involves the process of seeing phenomena
in novel ways. This involves a certain flexibility as well as precision in
perception as well as in the use of language. We ought, I believe, to avoid
language which suggests essences and absolutes and the notion that "we call
the sun the sun because kreally is the sun."
The chronic disease called "Hardening of the Categories" is prevalent in
the halls of academia. We organize knowledge into neat little ad
ministrative units called academic departments and we give them such
labels as Philosophy, Biology, Political Science, Psychology and on and on.
Although these are perspectives which are used to study aspects of human
experience, we treat them as discrete things. It is quite easy to goad
academicians into an argument as to whether a particular segment of
human experience is really a psychological, economic or political event.
The intricacies involved in the generation of new knowledge and un
derstandings necessitate the categorization and compartmentalization of
methodologies and concepts of academia. What is maladaptive is to confuse
them with things. I believe that the current disenchantment with education
is partially due to our failure to make knowledge whole and thereby per
ceivable as part of life. I believe that what is taught is potentially relevant to
life but we have so refined knowledge in our thinking and its organization
that it is no longer seen as relevant. We confuse labels, meanings,
definitions, and abstractions with experience and understanding.
Conclusion
I believe that the following rather common practices in education share
responsibility for the kinds of maladaptive thinking I have been discussing.
1. Although large numbers of words in our language are given many
meanings, we often teach and use them as though they had only one
meaning.
2. We indicate a written or spoken word and "What does it mean?"
instead of asking, "What does it refer to in this sentence?"
3. We ask questions and relate only to a right or wrong answer.
Typically, we do not encourage the student to restructure or
question the question.
4. We tend to separate the study of language and other com
munication skills from other areas of study.
5. We point to a thing or a picture of a thing and ask, "What is that?"
We are then pleased when the student supplies its label.
6. When a student uses a word we ask, "What does it mean?" and
accept another word for an answer.
7. We typically ask, "Is it this or is it that?"
8. We still, like my friend's son, think we know what makes apples fall
because we can use the wordgravity.
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